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KENTUCKY LAW jouRNAL
MERIDITH V. INGRAM: A FAILURE TO SHED
THE SHACKLES OF STARE DECISIS
In Meridith v. Ingram the Kentucky Court of Appeals held that
indefeasibly vested remaindermen were not barred by the statute
of limitations from bringing an action for permissive waste which
could have been maintained almost a half-century prior to the actual
bringing of the suit. In 1913, Riker Kyle2 was devisee in trust of a
farm of which:
... the rents, issues, and profits [were] to be applied first to the
payment of taxes and the proper maintenance of the farm, and the
residue thereof to be paid to said beneficiary during his lifetime 3
An indefeasibly vested remainder was devised which would ripen into
a fee simple absolute upon the death of Kyle. From 1924, upon the
resignation of the trustee and the failure to appoint a replacement,
Kyle acted as though he were a legal life tenant until his death in
November, 1965. Two suits, each seeking $30,000 damages, were in-
stituted in September, 1966, alleging that during Kyle's possession
he had allowed the farm to become dilapidated. One suit was filed in
Mercer County where the farm was located. The other suit was filed
in Boyle County where Kyle's personal representative qualified.4 In
its first decision, the Court of Appeals held that since the complaint
that had been filed in Boyle County alleged damages to real property,
the proper venue for the suit was in the county where the farm was
located.5 The remaindermen next attempted to amend their pleadings
in Boyle County to demand an accounting of trust income alleged
to have been improperly used. In its second decision, the Court of
Appeals held that the remaindermen were barred from amending
their complaint in Boyle County because that particular suit was no
longer pending.6 Thereafter, the only course available to the re-
maindermen was to prosecute the permissive waste action that
already had been filed in Mercer County.
The implications of the failure to appoint a trustee in 1924 and
other issues concerning the trust are not examined in this comment.
The scope of this discussion is confined solely to the issue of whether
1495 S.W.2d 171 (Ky. 1973). This was the third decision handed down in-
volving the same case.
2 The first two Meredith decisions referred to "Ricker" Kyle. See Meredith v.
Ingram, 465 S.W.2d 38 (Ky. 1971); Meredith v. Ingram, 444 S.W.2d 551 (Ky.
1969).
3495 S.W.2d at 171; 444 S.W.2d at 552.
4 Brief for Appellants at 6-7, Meredith v. Ingram, 495 S.W.2d 171 (Ky. 1973).
5 444 S.W.2d at 551.
6465 S.W.2d at 38.
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or not an indefeasibly vested remainderman should be required to
bring an action against a life tenant for permissive waste at the time it
occurs and prior to the termination of the life estate.
I. DEVELOPEmET OF THE LAW OF WASTE
A. English Law
The beginning point for the evolution of the law of waste occurred
in England more than eight hundred years ago.7 Early common law
provided that owners of life estates created by operation of law were
liable for waste, whereas owners of conventional life estates were not
liable unless a specific provision had been made for such liability.9
Commentators are in disagreement as to when owners of conventional
life estates were first held liable for waste.' 0
The first significant statute on the law of waste, the Statute of
Marlbridge," was enacted in 1267.12 It provided that "fermors"13 who
make waste shall be liable for it, but there is disagreement as to
whether tenants for life were included in the statute's coverage.14 Any
doubt as to the inclusion of the tenant for life was erased with the
enactment in 1278 of the Statute of Gloucester. Professor Simes15
believes that this statute enlarged the coverage of persons liable for
waste to expressly include tenants for life, whereas Professors Casner
and Powell1 are of the opinion that this statute did not broaden the
coverage of persons previously held liable by the Statute of Marlbridge.
Aside from this relatively insignificant area of conflict, the Statute of
Gloucester is chiefly noted for its procedural aspects in that it provided
for treble damages plus "forfeiture of 'the thing he hath wasted.'"",
The central question was whether the term "make waste" encom-
passed both voluntary and permissive waste.' 8 Coke and Blackstone
7 5 R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY ff 637 (1971) [hereinafter cited as
POw LL].8 These estates were dower, curtesy, and the rights of a guardian in chivalry.
POWELL 11 637.
9 4 L. Snas & A. SMITH, THE LAW OF FuTURE INrTEarsTs § 1654, at 8 (2d ed.
1956) [hereinafter cited as Snms & SMrr].
10 POWELL II 637.
1 This statute is also referred to as "Marlborough." Snis & SMIH § 1654,
at 8.
12 5 AMEaucAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 20.16 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952) [hereinafter
cited as ALP]; W. BuRnY, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 13 (3d ed.
1965) [hereinafter cited as BuRBy]; POWELL U 637; RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY §
139 (1936) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT]; SnmEs & SMITH § 1654, at 8.
13 ALP § 20.16, at 109; POWELL f1 637, at 7-8; SIMES & SMTrrH § 1654, at 8.
14 ALP § 20.17; POWELL ff 637; SmEs & SInTH § 1654, at 8.
1r Snms & SMITrH § 1654, at 8.
16 ALP § 20.17; POWELL II 637.
17 POWELL f1 637, at 9. See also ALP § 20.17; BuRBY § 13.
18 POWELL f 637; RESTATEmENT, supra note 12, § 139, comment a at 458.
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answered in the affirmative.' 9 However, the argument was presented
that "make" was equivalent to "commit" and that, therefore, affirmative
acts were contemplated by the drafters of the statute. The assertion
thereby arose that the statute referred only to voluntary waste.20
In rejecting the view of Coke and Blackstone, English courts estab-
lished the rule that a tenant for life is liable only for voluntary waste.21
American courts and the Restatement of Property followed the Coke
and Blackstone view that tenants for life are liable for permissive
waste.22 An even greater perplexity is evidenced by the failure of
either statute to hint at what acts constituted waste or even to define
"waste."23 Deliberate or otherwise, this omission created a vacuum
which inevitably has been filled by statutory and common law through
the centuries.
B. Modern Law
1. Definition of Waste
Professor Powell defines waste as "conduct ... on the part of the
person in possession of land which is actionable at the behest of, and
for the protection of the reasonable expectation of, another owner
of an interest in the same land."24 Other American commentators
define "waste" in terms of diminution of value of the occupied
premises.25 In Kentucky, waste has been defined as an act that "does
a lasting damage to the freehold."28
2. Voluntary Waste
There are several types of waste.27 This comment focuses only
upon voluntary and permissive waste. It is universally agreed that
voluntary waste includes affirmative acts, destructive in nature, which
reduce the value of the future interest;28 in addition, the injury to the
future interest must be substantial.29 The classic example of voluntary
waste is that of cutting timber. Perhaps Lord Coke, who first stated
that cutting timber constitutes waste, is responsible for the many
19 SimEs & SMrrI § 1654, at 8.
20 Id.
21 SniMs & SMrir § 1654, at 8.
2 2 RESTATEMENT, supra note 12, § 139, comment a at 458.
23 POWELL 9 637.24 
POWELL T 636, at 5.
25 BURny § 12; H. TIFFANY, Tim LAW OF REAL PROPERTY, § 322 (3rd ed.
abr. 1970) [hereinafter cited as TirFAN,].2 6 Loudon v. Warfield, 28 Ky. (5 J.J. Mar.) 196 (1830).
27 BuRBY § 12; POWELL fI 640; Snv Es & SmFrH § 1654, at 9-11.
28 ALP §§ 20.2-.10; BuSBY § 12; POWELL ff 640; SimEs & SmrrH § 1654, at 9.
See also Smith v. Mattingly, 28 S.W. 503 (Ky. 1894).2 9 BuRBY § 12; POWELL 9 640; Ti-FANY § 323.
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decisions in accord with that conclusion.30 Nevertheless, the common
law evolved exceptions to the timber-cutting rule. The right of estovers
permits a life tenant to cut timber necessary for fuel and agricultural
operations: 3' "The question is what would the tenant do with due
regard to the custom of the neighborhood, and in the exercise of good
husbandry, if he were the owner of the fee."
32
Another heavily litigated area of voluntary waste concerns the
removal of minerals from the soil. It is generally stated that a life
tenant may not engage in mining operations unless the land was
being mined at the creation of the life estate; a life tenant may not
open new mines or quarries but may continue the operation already in
existence.
33
3. Permissive Waste
While it is recognized that voluntary waste includes affirmative
acts, the converse is true regarding permissive waste. Permissive waste
results from an omission, a failure to exercise proper care respecting
one's duties.34 In some instances, therefore, a life tenant is guilty of
permissive waste by literally doing nothing.
A life tenant ". . . is obligated to preserve the land and structure
in a reasonable state of repair, but he is not bound to make expendi-
tures for the purpose in excess of the profits, rent or income received
by him."30 He is also obligated to pay property taxes, interest on
mortgages, and betterment assessments.30 Failure to fulfill these obliga-
tions will sustain an action for permissive waste.37 Judicial recognition
of this duty appears in Prescott v. Grimes,3 8 a case in which a widow
acquired a 200 acre farm as her dower interest in her husband's estate
and left the farm in a dilapidated state at her death. In discussing
the duty of a life tenant to maintain his estate in good condition, the
Court reviewed earlier Kentucky cases which held, inter alia, that a
tenant for life has a duty to make repairs, pay taxes, and pay for the
cost of repairing pavement in front of his property. The Court added,
3 0 ALP 20.1.
31 ALP 20.2; BuRBY § 14; POWELL. 11 640; TIFFANY § 327.
32 Tn-T. y § 326, at 262.
33 Bufmy § 14; POWELL U1 610; Snms & Sxmrm § 1654, at 9-10.3 4 ALP § 20.12; BunnY §§ 12, 14; PoWxiLL 9 640. See also Smith v. Mattingly,
28 S.W. 503 (Ky. 1894).
35 C. MoYNHAN, INTRODUCTON TO THE LAv OF REAL P3 OPERTY § 12, at 60
(2d ed. 1956) [hereinafter cited as MoYNn- ]; see, e.g., Lindenberger v. Cornell,
229 S.W. 54 (Ky. 1921); Fisher's Ex'r v. Haney, 202 S.W. 495 (Ky. 1918);
Prescott v. Grimes, 136 S.W. 206 (Ky. 1911).
36 ALP § 20.12; MoyiNmAN_ , supra note 35, § 12; RESTATEMENT, supra note 12,
§ 139; TFFANY §§ 61-62.
37 TIFFANY §§ 61-62.
38 136 S.W. 206 (Ky. 1911).
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however, that the tenant for life had only a duty to deliver the
property in a reasonable state of repair at the end of the tenancy.
Under the Prescott rationale, it would be possible to neglect the estate
for several years and later repair it without being liable for per-
missive waste.
C. Methods to Determine the Existence of Waste
Various approaches exist to determine whether certain conduct is
actionable as waste. The "mnemonic" approach fixes 'liability to
certain acts, regardless of their factual context."39 For example, if
cutting timber is considered waste, this is an act of waste in and of
itself under the mnemonic approach without regard to any mitigating
circumstances such as the need for firewood. This approach has been
severely criticized,40 because even Lord Coke, who stated that cutting
timber was waste,41 recognized that there were some exceptions to his
statement. The "functional" approach inquires whether the inheritance
has been damaged.42 Professor Tiffany recognized this approach as
the proper one.43 In addition, he suggested that the inquiry was not
complete without considering the particular locality, because acts
which constitute waste in one locale may not constitute waste in
another. For example, cutting timber in a region traditionally relying
upon the woodlands for agriculture purposes would produce a different
result than would cutting timber in a region economically dependent
upon lumber as a commercial enterprise. The third approach centers
upon intention. In a unilateral conveyance, it is the donor's intention
that controls, and in the absence of express provisions, prohibiting
certain acts, the inquiry becomes whether the donor impliedly in-
tended that certain acts would constitute waste. Professor Casner
suggests that the intent approach is the proper one.44 He rejects the
notion that the functional approach applies in all situations and sug-
gests that the functional approach is valid only when applied in con-
junction with the intent approach.45
D. Remedies
The law of waste in the United States is largely statutory. The
remedies of the Statute of Gloucester46 were not received in this
39 ALP § 20.1, at 71.
40Id.
41 Id. at 71-72.
42Id.; TIFFANY § 323.
43 TFFANY § 323. Tiffany states that this method is the primary one used
today to determine the existence or non-existence of waste.44ALP § 20.1.
45 Id.46 See generally ALP § 20.17; ButaBy § 13; PowELL II 637.
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country47 as part of the common law in a majority of the states. 48
Nevertheless, there are numerous remedies available to the holder
of an indefeasibly vested remainder or reversion against a life tenant:
[The future interest holder] . . . may secure compensatory dam-
ages for the injuries sustained[,] . . . recover multiple damages, or
S.. forfeit the life estate .... He may enjoin threatened acts of
waste, or secure a mandatory injunction to compel the performance
of a duty by the life tenant with respect to the care of premises.
He may be entitled to an accounting for the proceeds of sales by
the life tenant of something improperly severed from the land. In
a proper case he is privileged to enter and inspect the premises to
determine whether waste has been committed. He may also have
a receiver appointed to make repairs on the structures when the life
tenant has failed to do so. In some cases, he may have a receiver
appointed to sell the property and hold the proceeds in trust.
49
II. JuDIciAL TPET mEN OF PEmumssrvE WASTE
A. Kentucky
The availability of the remedies referred to above varies among the
states depending upon the category59 of waste involved. In Kentucky,
the remedies of the Statute of Gloucester 5' were enacted in 17982 and
remain in effect substantially unchanged.5 3 In SalyeFs Guardian V.
Keeton,54 the similarity between the Kentucky statute and the Statute
of Gloucester was recognized when the Court stated that the Kentucky
statute should be construed as the English statute had been. 55
47 Forfeiture and treble damages have been abolished in England. ALP §
20.19.48 BunBY § 13; POWELL F, 650; RESTATEmFNT, supra note 12, §§ 198-99; SIMEs
& S~rH § 1658.
49 Sn~ms & SMITH § 1654, at 11-12; see also ALP §§ 20.17-.23; BurB § 13;
POWELL f11l 641-42.
'0 See sources cited in note 27 supra.
51 See supra note 17.
5 2 Law of January 23, 1798, ch. 44, § 1, [1799] Laws of Ky. 83 (now Ky. Rmr.
STAT. § 381.350 (1971) [hereinafter cited as KRS] provided:
Be it enacted by the General Assembly, that if any tenant by the courtesy
tenant, in dower, or otherwise for term of life or years, shall commit waste,
during their several estates, or terms, of the houses, woods, or any other
thing, belonging to the tenants, so held, without special license, in writing
so to do, they shall be subject respectively to an action of waste, and shall
moreover loose [sic] the thing wasted, and recompence the party injured,
at three times the amount, at which the waste, shall be assessed.
53 KRS § 381.350 provides:
If any tenant for life or years commits waste during his estate or term, of
anything belonging to the tenement so held, without special written per-
mission to do so, he shall be subject to an action of waste, shall lose the
thing wasted, and pay treble the amount at which the waste is assessed.
54 283 S.W. 1015 (Ky. 1926).
55 To be entitled to treble damages in Kentucky, the waste must have been
"wantonly committed." KRS § 381.400.
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In Smith v. Mattingly,"6 a case similar to Meredith v. Ingram with
respect to the acts allegedly constituting waste, the Court of Appeals
held that the Kentucky statute refers only to voluntary waste. This
construction, said the Court, was necessitated by 'language . .. too
clear for discussion."5 7 The Court examined the history of legislation
on the subject of waste and concluded that since the remedy of the
1798 statute which permitted an action at law for permissive waste
had been omitted from the statute then in existence, this omission was
a repeal of the action at law. Moreover, the Court was convinced
that the members of the General Assembly must have viewed the
equitable remedy for permissive waste as "more easy, expeditious, and
complete" 8 than a remedy at law. Lastly, the Court held that a
remedy at law did not exist for permissive waste; therefore, exclusive
jurisdiction over permissive waste had been left to courts of equity.
A further development of the law of waste in Kentucky occurred
in Prescott v. Grimes59 where the Court held that the statute of
limitations would not bar an action for permissive waste during the
life tenancy. The Court arrived at its decision by reasoning that since
the life tenant had a continuing duty only to leave the premises in a
reasonable state of repair at the end of the tenancy, he could allow the
premises to deteriorate at any time and still not be liable for permissive
waste if the necessary repairs were completed prior to the termination
of the tenancy. Moreover, the Prescott opinion stated that a life
tenant's estate would be subject to an action for the cost of repairs
necessitated by permissive waste.
In a later case, Fishers Executor v. Haney,60 involving an action
brought in equity to recover damages against a life tenant's executor
for both permissive and voluntary waste, the defense of the statute
of limitations was interposed by the defendant. The Court stated that
the statute of limitations began to run when the voluntary waste was
committed and that, under this rule, plaintiffs could not recover for
the voluntary waste because it had been committed more than five
years prior to the commencement of the suit and thus was barred by
the statute of limitations. As for the permissive waste, however, the
Court relied upon Prescott in allowing recovery, since the life tenant
had an "ever-present, existing duty"61 to leave the premises in a reason-
56 28 S.W. 503 (Ky. 1894); see also Collins v. Security Trust Co., 266 S.W.
910 (Ky. 1924); Continental Fuel Co. v. Haden, 206 S.W. 8 (Ky. 1918); Fisher's
Ex'r v. Haney, 202 S.W. 495 (Ky. 1918).
57 28 S.W. 503 (Ky. 1894).
58 Id. at 504.
59 136 S.W. 206 (Ky. 1911).
60 202 S.W. 495 (Ky. 1918).
61 Id. at 497, citing Prescott v. Grimes, 136 S.W. 206, 208 (Ky. 1911) (em-
phasis added).
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able state of repair. "During the life of the tenancy there is no
limitation to the time within which the action to compel reparation
for permissive waste must be commenced."62
In Collins v. Security Trust Co.,6 3 the Court of Appeals again out-
lined the conditions under which action for damages64 for permissive
waste. There the Court stated:
... it cannot be doubted that in this jurisdiction an action purely
for damages for permissive waste can be maintained in equity,
and there only, by the remaindermen against the estate of the
original life tenant, at the expiration of his tenancy. 65
B. Other jurisdictions
The result in Meredith v. Ingram was based upon clear authority;
however, when confronted with the same issue of whether or not an
indefeasibly vested remainderman should be required to bring an
action against a life tenant for permissive waste prior to the termi-
nation of the life estate, other jurisdictions have reached a result
contrary to the result reached in Kentucky.
An Ohio case, Reams v. Henney,66 has held that in an action for
permissive waste against a life tenant's estate, the applicable statute
of limitations barred any evidence of waste committed or suffered prior
to the statutory period for filing of the suit. The Ohio court dis-
tinguished Prescott by stating that while the Kentucky statute covered
only voluntary waste, the Ohio statute covered both voluntary and
permissive waste, because the Ohio statute used the language "com-
mits or suffers" 6 7 Holding that the cause of action, for statute of
limitations purposes, accrued not at the death of the life tenant but
rather at the moment when the waste first occurred, 6 the Reams court
relied upon the North Carolina case of Sherrill v. Connor9 and thus
62202 S.W. at 497, citing Prescott v. Grimes, 136 S.W. 206, 208 (Ky. 1911).
63266 S.W. 910 (Ky. 1924).
64 The proper measure of damages is the difference between the value of the
prmssin its present coadition and what it would have been had the life tenant
mitied the premises in a reasonable state of repair. See, e.g., In re Estate of
Stout, 50 P.2d 768 (Ore. 1935).
0r 266 S.W. 910, 911 (Ky. 1924) (emphasis added).
6697 N.E.2d 37 (Ohio App. 1950).
7 Omio REv. CODE ANN. § 2105.20 (1968) provides:
A tenant for life in real property who commits or suffers waste thereto
shall forfeit that part of the property, to which such waste is committed
or suffered, to the person having the immediate estate in reversion or
remainder and such tenant will be liable in damages to such person for
the waste committed or suffered thereto.
68 The North Carolina statute is not as explicit as the Ohio statute. N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 1.533 (1969) states:
Wrongs, remediable by the old action of waste, are subjects of action
as other wrongs; and the judgment may be for damages, forfeiture of the
estate of the party offending, and eviction from the premises.
69 12 S.E. 588 (N.C. 1890).
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reached a conclusion contrary to that reached in Prescott. The court
in Sherrill reversed a trial court determination that no statute of
limitations applied to permissive waste due to the continuous duty of
the life tenant to maintain the premises.
III. IMPLICATIONS OF MFmDrrH v. INGIAm
As previously stated, in Kentucky there was no action at law70 for
permissive waste. 71 Moreover, in this jurisdiction an action purely for
damages may be maintained only at the termination of the life ten-
ancy.72 While in some cases injunctive relief plus an accounting for
waste will be awarded,73 this additional remedy is usually available
only where the complainant has a damage remedy available.74 For ex-
ample, a remainderman in Kentucky may be confronted with a situation
in which the life tenant has allowed the premises, consisting of a house,
barn, and other out-buildings, to deteriorate below a state of reason-
able repair. If this remainderman is contemplating a plan to develop
the premises as a commercial venture, would he rather have a decree
enjoining future waste and a decree to repair the premises or
damages once the life tenant dies? Would it matter that he receive the
premises in a reasonable state of repair if the site would have to be
cleared for development? Under these circumstances, a recovery for
damages would amount to a windfall.
To allow a remainderman to stand idly by75 and permit a life tenant
to "suffer the property to become out of repair for years and later fix
it up"76 without compelling the remainderman to seek injunctive relief
seems contrary to the public policy of this Commonwealth. Since the
remainderman has no obligation to bring an action, the property is
allowed to recede into a blighted condition with the resultant diminu-
tion in property tax revenues.
77
70 Notwithstanding the widespread merger of law and equity courts, there
still exists a tendency on the part of lawyers and judges to speak of law and equity
as though they are separate courts. Nevertheless, aside from the right to jury
trial, in some instances there may be sufficient reason to retain the distinction
between legal and equitable remedies. D. DOBBS, LAw Or B.R mrEs §§ 2.1-
.9 (1973).
71 Smith v. Mattingly, 28 S.W. 503 (Ky. 1894).
72 Collins v. Security Trust Co., 266 S.W. 910 (Ky. 1924).
73 ALP § 20.20.
74 Id. at § 20.22.
75 Biker Kyle was an invalid for the last ten years of his life, the last five
years of which were spent in a hospital. Brief for Appellant at 4-5, Meredith v.
Ingram, 495 S.W.2d 171 (Ky. 1973).
76 136 S.W. 206, 208 (Ky. 1911) (emphasis added).
77 See Muskie, Student Symposium on Kentucky Property Tax, 60 Ky. L.J. 75
(1971). For a discussion of the importance of ad valorem taxes to public education
in the United States, see O'Connell, Symposium: Equal Protection Against Unequal
Schools, 1972 U. ILL. L. FoR. 215. See also Schoettle, Judicial Requirements for
School Finance and Property Tax Design: The Rapidly Evolving Case Law, 25 NAT.
T.J. 455 (1972).
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There are solutions to the present inequitable state of the law on
permissive waste in Kentucky. The first possible solution would involve
reversal of more than 75 years of judicial reliance upon prior decisions
beginning with Smith v. Mattingly.7" A judicial remedy, however, is
not likely, due to the explicit wording of the Kentucky statute79 and
to the very thorough analysis the statute received in Mattingly.
If any remedy is forthcoming in this area, it presumably will come
from the General Assembly due to the Court of Appeals' strong
dependence on Smith v. Mattingly and its progeny. The Kentucky
statute should be amended to read ". .. commits or suffers waste..."
in order to encompass both voluntary and permissive waste. Support
for such an interpretation of "commits or suffers" appears in Reams
and Prescott. In the latter, the Court, explaining the duties of a tenant
for life to maintain his estate, stated that "he may not suffer it to go to
decay or waste for want of necessary repairs any more than he may
injure its value by acts of voluntary waste."80 The indefeasibly vested
remainderman should have to ifie suit seeking injunctive relief either
when he knows or should know that the life tenant is not fulfilling his
obligation to maintain the premises in a reasonable state of repair.
After the statute has been so amended, the Court of Appeals should
adopt the rationale of Reams and Sherrill when a cause of action for
permissive waste accrues.
The unimaginable implications of Meredith v. Ingram should serve
as a catalyst for the General Assembly to extricate our present state of
law from an outmoded and unjust rule. While ancient rules and
maxims form the cornerstone upon which our legal system has been
constructed, such guidelines must be adaptable to constantly changing
conditions. The present rule regarding permissive waste, engendered
by a line of cases beginning with Smith v. Mattingly,81 is a rule that
is no longer adaptable, and the law of future interests82 respecting an
indefeasibly vested remainderman's cause of action for permissive
waste in Kentucky should be changed to meet today's socio-economic
needs.
Alva A. Hollon, Jr.
78 28 S.W. 503 (1894).
7
9 KRS § 381.350 (1971).
80 136 S.W. 206, 207 (Ky. 1911) (emphasis added).
8128 S.W. 503 (1894).8 2 For a discussion of changes in the lawv of future interests, see Fratcher, A
Mlodest Proposal for Trimming the Claws of Legal Future Interests, 1972 DUKE L.
517. See also Mersky, Introductory Essay on the Literature of Future Interests, 17
VAND. L. REv. 1457 (1964), for a survey of texts and treatises covering the law
of future interests.
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